The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is already shaping up to be an event of historic proportions. This includes, but is certainly not limited to, its implications for global catastrophic risk. We at GCRI are monitoring the unfolding events with great concern. While it is always important to understand all parties’ perspectives on a conflict, in this case we find ourselves strongly condemning the actions of the Russian government. Our hearts go out to the many people in Ukraine who have been tragically affected by the invasion. For their sake and for the sake of the world at large, we sincerely hope for a prompt and peaceful resolution.
Why Focus on Ukraine?
The invasion of Ukraine is hardly the only violent conflict to have occurred in recent years. The largest conflicts in 2021 were in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Yemen. Some of the extensive attention going to the invasion of Ukraine may be due to a favoritism of Ukraine over other places of conflict on the grounds of race, religion, and/or affluence. It is important to recognize the devastation of violent conflict regardless of where or to whom it occurs. (See also the GCRI Statement on Racism.) Nonetheless, Ukraine’s status as a large country sandwiched between Russia and NATO makes it of additional geopolitical significance, including for matters related to global catastrophic risk, especially the risk of nuclear war.
Rival Perspectives
In any international conflict, it is important to understand all parties’ perspectives. We, the signatories of this statement, are American, and our colleagues are primarily from the West and other allied areas. We are inherently sympathetic to Ukraine as a peaceful democratic state that has been violently invaded by its neighbor. For this reason, it is important for us to make extra effort to try to understand the situation from Russia’s perspective, for example by considering interviews with knowledgeable experts, statements by Russian diplomats, and in-depth analyses.
While the entirety of Russia’s perspective is beyond the scope of this statement, here are some main points as we understand them. The Russian government desires to maintain the country’s status as an independent locus of power in a multipolar world and to avoid being subsumed by the spread of democracy such as in eastern European color revolutions. (Whether the Russian people share these desires is a separate matter, especially noting anti-war activities and low awareness of the war among Russians.) Ukraine is additionally of geostrategic, cultural, and historical importance to Russia. A democratic Ukraine can choose to align itself with the West, and indeed it often has, especially since the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for insurgencies in eastern Ukraine. It is therefore understandable that the Russian government would desire an allied Ukrainian government and would see military invasion as the primary means available to achieve that goal.
Though understandable, in our view, this does not remotely justify the violent overthrow of an independent nation. We are further dubious of Russian government claims of Ukraine pursuing nuclear weapons or the need to “denazify” a country with a Jewish president. We will continue to listen to Russian perspectives, and we welcome the opportunity to be corrected of anything we do not adequately understand. Meanwhile, we find ourselves agreeing with those who strongly condemn Russia’s actions as dangerous, unlawful, and immoral.
Nuclear War Risk
As scholars of nuclear war risk, it is clear to us that the Russian invasion of Ukraine increases the risk of nuclear war. The only question is how large the increase is. As with other global catastrophic risks, the risk of nuclear war is inherently difficult to quantify in terms of its probability and severity. In deference to the high uncertainty surrounding the size of the risk, we will abstain from attempting to quantify it here. Instead, we offer some general perspective on the pathways to nuclear war and accompanying risk reduction opportunities.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of pathways to nuclear war. First, in intentional nuclear war, one side makes a deliberate decision to initiate nuclear war based on an accurate understanding of the world. Second, in inadvertent nuclear war, one side mistakenly believes it is under nuclear attack and launches a first-strike attack that it falsely believes is a retaliation. Both types of pathway seem potentially applicable to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, for both types of pathway, nuclear war is more likely when tensions are high. The invasion of Ukraine has unfortunately made tensions very high.
If intentional nuclear war occurs in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, it seems most likely be initiated by Russia. Ukraine has no nuclear weapons. Ukraine is receiving military assistance from many countries, including nuclear-armed France, the UK, and the US, as well as other members of NATO. These countries have been careful to emphasize that they are not sending troops or directly engaging in conflict, though they could nonetheless become more actively entangled. However, NATO countries have more capable conventional (non-nuclear) military forces, a fact made all the more apparent by early struggles of the Russian military in Ukraine. It is unlikely that NATO would need to resort to nuclear war. If anyone would resort to the use of nuclear weapons, it would likely be Russia, especially if it is otherwise struggling to win. Putin is reportedly unusually frustrated and angry at Russia’s struggles in the conflict, and some longtime observers suspect that he would, under some circumstances, order the launch of nuclear weapons.
Russian use of nuclear weapons could target Ukraine, NATO, or potentially other targets. Ukraine could be targeted, for example, if it appears otherwise poised for a military victory. Russia could use its tactical nuclear weapons to avoid suffering a humiliating military defeat at the hands of its smaller neighbor. NATO parties could be targeted, for example, if they become more heavily involved in the conflict, especially if NATO forces are directly attacking Russian forces and pushing them to the brink of defeat. The same holds for any other, non-NATO forces that participate in the conflict.
To avoid intentional nuclear war, it is imperative to find Putin and Russia viable, face-saving opportunities to end the war and calm tensions. This should be a high priority for all parties. This may seem counterintuitive given Russia’s apparent culpability for the war and lack of moral high ground. The world may face a difficult dilemma: either find something that Russia can point to as a win or risk nuclear war. This dilemma is especially difficult for the Ukrainian people, who are already enduring the bulk of the suffering and fighting valiantly in response. Unfortunately, however, more extensive NATO support for Ukraine, such as implementing a no-fly zone, should be weighed against the risk of nuclear war. This dilemma appears to be at the forefront of current decision-making, which provides some reassurance, though widespread popular support for Ukraine could change the political calculus. It is deeply uncomfortable to suggest that the popular support for Ukraine may be making things worse. This underscores the urgency of finding some sort of means of ending the war and calming international tensions in a way that would be acceptable to Putin and Russia and, if at all possible, also in the interests of the Ukrainian people and in the common values of the international community.
Inadvertent nuclear war could involve either Russian or NATO nuclear forces. If one side is anticipating an attack from the other side, it is more likely to misinterpret some other event as a nuclear attack by the other side. The event could be a non-war nuclear explosion, such as nuclear terrorism or an accidental weapon detonation. Or, the event could be a false alarm such as due to human error, a technological glitch in warning systems, or a nonmilitary event such as an asteroid impact. The longer the war persists, the more likely it is that such an event would occur. Throughout the war, Russia and NATO should be especially careful to distinguish nuclear attacks from other types of events and to avoid taking actions that could be misinterpreted by the other side in a way that may prompt the other side to launch nuclear weapons. Both sides disagree on many things, but they should agree that inadvertent nuclear war is to be avoided.
Other Global Catastrophic Risks
Nuclear war is not the only risk affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fact that multiple risks are affected speaks to the importance of a holistic, systemic approach to analyzing and addressing global catastrophic risk.
Climate change risk is affected by the war in several ways. First, Russia’s role as a fossil fuel exporter has factored centrally in the geopolitics. The desire to avoid Russian natural gas may prompt some short-term increase in coal and more aggressive long-term switch to clean energy sources, especially in Europe. Second, the war itself involves burning a lot of fossil fuel to operate military vehicles and facilities. Indeed, a lack of fuel has been one source of problems for Russian forces. Third, economic measures taken against Russia’s unusually large usage of offshore tax havens, such as recent sanctions by Monaco, could lead to tax reform that would be broadly beneficial for climate change policy. Fourth, there may be a small probability that attacks at Ukrainian nuclear power plants could release radioactivity. In addition to any localized harms, there may be reduced interest in nuclear power, driving up fossil fuel usage. Finally, there are concerns that attention to the war could displace climate change from the policy agenda. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) just released a new report on the impacts of climate change; were it not for the war, this would have garnered more attention.
With the COVID-19 pandemic still taking its toll, pandemic risk is inevitably intertwined with the war. It is darkly poetic to have another war in Europe during a pandemic 100 years later. Ukraine suffers from a low COVID-19 vaccination rate, driven by an infodemic of misinformation that may derive in part from Russia. The war may further exacerbate the pandemic, such as via people crowding in bomb shelters or disruption of hospital supply chains. Furthermore, the pandemic may be altering decision-making in important ways, such as in reports that Putin’s social distancing bubble has altered his emotions and priorities toward a desire to bring Ukraine back under Moscow’s control. Additionally, disruptions to Ukrainian biosafety labs, including loss of electricity and personnel, could result in pathogen escape. With the world already weary with “pandemic fatigue” from two years of COVID-19, it may struggle to contain a new pandemic pathogen.
Artificial intelligence is playing a role in the war, though perhaps only a minor role. Military operations have emphasized tanks, artillery, and even Molotov cocktails instead of more high-tech drones and other AI-driven technology. Presumably AI has played a role in some of the operations, but it does not appear to factor centrally. Outside the context of military operations, AI has been used, for example, to generate fake faces for imaginary people used by Russia in anti-Ukraine social media disinformation campaigns. However, much of the spread of misinformation has been human-driven, such as in the widespread circulation of legitimate photographs from before the war that are falsely presented as being from the war. (Some individuals have also observed a significant decline in social media trolls spreading climate change denialism and anti-vaccine messages after Twitter was restricted in Russia, an observation consistent with the firehose of falsehood model of Russian disinformation.) There have also been cyber attacks against both sides, though without the devastating attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that some had feared, and it is unclear how much of a role AI played in the attacks. Furthermore, long-term implications for AI are diminished by the fact that Russia and Ukraine are not among the main countries for AI development.
Arguably, the primary international competition in AI is between China and the US, or between China and the West more generally. China is also of high importance for a range of other global catastrophic risks. The invasion of Ukraine puts China in a complex position. China has close ties with Russia but also does extensive business with Ukraine, the West, and other countries supporting Ukraine. China also emphasizes the principle of state sovereignty, which Russia has flagrantly violated, though Russia’s claim to Ukraine bears some similarity to China’s claim to Taiwan. China appears to be threading the needle on the war, such as by abstaining on the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Russia. This would appear to leave China-West relations essentially unchanged despite the broader international turmoil from the war. As before, the relations remain at an adversarial simmer, and not the intense boil that now marks the relationship between Russia and the West. Absent further changes, the net effect on AI risk looks to be similarly marginal.
Finally, all global catastrophic risks are affected by the changes to international relations caused by the war. Addressing the risks benefits significantly from international cooperation. Suffice to say, Russia’s actions are a significant setback for international cooperation, though much hope can be found in the widespread international support for Ukraine. This underscores the importance of finding some means of resolving the war and rebuilding relations. If there is a way out of this, especially one that puts Russia on the road to becoming a responsible member of the international community, then better days for the international community may await.
Sincerely,
Seth Baum, Executive Director
Tony Barrett, Director of Research
McKenna Fitzgerald, Deputy Director
Image credit: Міністерство внутрішніх справ України
